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Is The Supreme Court Disabling the Enabling Act, or is Shady Grove Just Another
Bad Opera?1
Robert J. Condlin2

I. INTRODUCTION
When a party to a lawsuit in federal court argues that a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure governs an issue before the court, and the opposing party argues that state law
governs the issue, the court has a Rules Enabling Act (Enabling Act or Act) problem.3
To resolve it, the court must determine whether the Federal Rule is pertinent to the issue
in dispute; if it is, whether the Rule is valid under the Enabling Act; and if it is, whether
the Enabling Act itself is constitutional.4 Think of this as the PVC standard.5 If the
answer to all three questions is yes, the court must apply the Federal Rule, for there can
be no higher law.
A Federal Rule is pertinent to an issue in dispute if, by its own terms, it provides a
standard for deciding that issue.6 Rule 4 is pertinent to an issue of whether service of
process is adequate, for example, because Rule 4, by its own terms, provides the federal

1

See DANIEL L. GROOVER & CECIL C. CONNER, JR., SKELETONS FROM THE OPERA CLOSET (1994) (listing
the world’s worst operas). Not all operas involving the Supreme Court are bad. See Scalia/Ginsburg, “an
operatic fantasy” in the style of The Magic Flute, with lyrics based on Justices Ginsburg and Scalia’s
opposing views about constitutional interpretation. See Emily Langer, Derrick Wang Discusses
“Scalia/Ginsburg,” His Opera About the Supreme Court Justices, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/derrick-wang-discusses-scaliaginsburg-his-opera-about-thesupreme-court-justices/2013/10/03/7ec92c2a-2624-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html.
2
Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. I am grateful to the UM Foundation for
its generous financial support, and to participants in the University of Maryland School of Law Faculty
Workshop for their very helpful comments and suggestions.
3
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). There are esoteric versions of the Rules Enabling Act problem
but the one involving a so-called direct collision between a Federal Rule and state law is the prototype.
There can be an Enabling Act problem without such a “direct collision,” see Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 n.4 (1998), but there is no such scenario in the case law, and the possibility is more
theoretical than real. See Robert J. Condlin, “A Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine
& Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 508-12 (2005) [hereinafter Formstone] (describing the
nature of a Rules Enabling Act problem).
4
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (“We conclude that . . . Rule 4 (d)(1), designed to control
service of process in diversity actions, neither exceeded the congressional mandate in the Rules Enabling
Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that the Rule is therefore the standard against which the
District Court should have measured the adequacy of service.”)
5
Pertinence + Validity + Constitutionality = PVC. If the Erie/Hanna doctrine is a “Formstone of our
federalism,” see Condlin, Formstone, supra note 3, at 475 n.1, then Enabling Act jurisprudence is
federalism’s polyvinyl chloride.
6
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980). The Court often expresses the point as the
Rule being “sufficiently broad” to “govern” or “control” the resolution of the issue.

standard for determining the adequacy of service.7 A Federal Rule is valid under the
Enabling Act if it is a “rule[] of practice and procedure” and8 it does not “abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”9 The Enabling Act authorizes the creation of
only procedural rules and any attempt to use it to make substantive “rules of decision”
would be invalid.10 Finally, the Enabling Act itself must be a proper exercise of
Congress’s legislative power under the Judiciary Article and the Necessary and Proper
Clause of the Constitution to authorize the creation of Federal Rules in the first
instance.11 That issue, once decided (as it has been),12 remains an unstated premise of all
Enabling Act analysis.
Over the years, the validity part of the PVC standard has proven the most difficult
part to understand and apply, and that is a little surprising. The Enabling Act’s language
is relatively clear, but even if it was not, one would have expected seventy plus years of
case law interpretation to have removed any lingering ambiguities and confusions. The
fact that the Supreme Court never has found a Federal Rule invalid also suggests that the
Act’s validity standard is not that difficult to understand and apply.13 But agreeing on a
definitive statement of the Enabling Act’s validity standard, as well as the proper method
for determining the meaning of that standard, has proven elusive.
The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into this interpretive thicket, in Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,14 raised the hope that this
longstanding problem finally would be resolved, but when the Shady Grove decision was
announced it became clear that the lack of a resolution was the only thing that was final.
Justices Scalia15 and Ginsburg were the principal antagonists in Shady Grove and the
differences in their views were as pronounced as any in the long history of the debate
over the Act. Justice Scalia (with Justice Stevens’s help), carried the day on outcome in
7

See FED. R. CIV. P. 4. The Federal Rules do not always govern when they seem to. For example, in
Walker, the Court held that Rule 3 does not govern the issue of when a lawsuit is commenced for state
statute of limitations purposes, notwithstanding that Rule 3, by its own terms, regulates the
“commencement” of a lawsuit. Statutes of limitations are substantive, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 110-11 (1945), and the Federal Rules cannot create substantive law. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 75051, and the discussion in Condlin, Formstone, supra note 3, at 519-21. Whether a federal court must apply
state law in the absence of a pertinent Federal Rule is governed by the Rules of Decision Act, not the
Enabling Act. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469-70.
8
I highlight the conjunction because over the years the Supreme Court has taken different positions on the
question of whether the Act articulates a one- or two-part standard. See infra.
9
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
10
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (“Congress has undoubted power to regulate the
practice and procedure of federal courts . . . but it has never essayed to declare the substantive law . . . .).
11
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
12
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9-10.
13
The Court has found ways to take a Federal Rule out of the picture without invalidating it. See note 102,
infra.
14
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
15
This article was written before Justice Scalia’s recent death, but the view of the Enabling Act he
expressed in Shady Grove is shared by other members of the Court and remains one of the two principal
interpretations of the Act competing for dominance. It makes sense to continue to refer to the view as his.
He was its most eloquent and forceful defender.
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the case, but he was able to muster only three other votes for his particular interpretation
of the Act; and now that Justice Scalia has died and Justice Stevens has retired, there may
not be a majority on the Court for even the outcome.16 The Court’s failure to bring this
longstanding interpretive brouhaha to a conclusion has left lower courts free to parse the
Enabling Act on their own, and this has resulted in the wide variety of views one would
expect when federal judges are free to think for themselves.17 After all of these years,
confusion and disagreement abound, at both the highest and lowest levels, so much so in
fact that the Enabling Act now effectively has been disabled as a rule of law.18 The
temptation to ask how this could have happened is irresistible.
I will discuss the Enabling Act’s interpretive discontents in the following manner.
In Section II I will describe the competing views in the debate over the Act’s meaning
and the relatively small number of cases in which those views are defined and developed.
In Section III I will explain how the Shady Grove decision clarifies the points of
disagreement in the debate, but does not reconcile or resolve them. Finally, in Section IV
I will explain why the debate may never end, why the Supreme Court is likely to oscillate
indefinitely between the polar positions of Justices Scalia and Ginsburg (and their
ancestors, heirs, and assigns), as if mired in an interminable Kipling-Marx debate
grounded on incompatible premises and devoid of shared principles.19

II. THE RULES ENABLING ACT AND ITS INTERPRETIVE DISCONTENTS
On its face, the Rules Enabling Act does not seem to be a confusing statute. It
says, in relevant part:
16

See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy-Enhancing Benefits of Erie
Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 911 (2011) (“With Stevens’s departure from the Court and replacement
with Justice Elena Kagan, one can hardly be confident that Shady Grove would come out the same way
were it reargued today.”).
17
Even when it is possible to predict when a federal court will apply a Federal Rule, it is difficult to know
on what basis the court will make this decision, and thus difficult to know on what basis to argue the point.
Lawyers must make every possible argument as a consequence, and charge clients for all of them.
Disagreement over the Act’s meaning not only is confusing, it also is expensive.
18
See infra Section IV.
19
The Shady Grove case does not lack for academic commentary or advice on how to resolve the debate.
See Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine from A
Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939 (2011); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2010); Kevin
Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987 (2011); Jack Friedenthal,
Defining the Word “Maintain”; Context Counts, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1139 (2011); Jennifer S. Hendricks, In
Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 103 (2011); Allen Ides, The
Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate
Between Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041 (2011); Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice
of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1
(2012); Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady
Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131 (2011); Stempel, supra note 16; Catherine T. Struve, Institutional
Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1181 (2011).
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(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice
and procedure . . . for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of
appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws
in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect.20
Read literally, this language seems to articulate a two-part standard for
determining the validity of a Federal Rule. To be valid, a Rule first must be a rule of
“practice and procedure” (subsection a), and second, it must “not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right” (subsection b).21 The terms “practice and procedure” and
“substantive right” are not self-defining, of course, but each has a long history in law and
one would expect that the Enabling Act’s use of them would have been made clear in the
case law. In real life, however, one would be disappointed. The Supreme Court
sometimes has interpreted the expression “rules of practice and procedure,” to include
both substantive and procedural rules, and sometimes interpreted the expression
“substantive rights” to refer to nothing at all, and the decisions announcing these
confusing and not always consistent interpretations continue to fuel the debate over the
meaning of the Act.22 I will review the most important of these decisions and describe
the difficulties they create for understanding the Act.23
1) Sibbach v. Wilson
The Supreme Court interpreted the Enabling Act for the first time in 1941, in the
celebrated case of Sibbach v. Wilson,24 and that decision continues to play a prominent
role in Enabling Act jurisprudence down to the present day. In Sibbach, the Court was
asked to determine (in effect) whether the defendant’s request to conduct a compulsory
medical examination of the plaintiff was governed by Federal Rule 35, which authorized
the examination, or conflicting state law, which arguably25 prohibited it. The plaintiff
had filed a negligence action in the Northern District of Illinois seeking to recover for
injuries suffered in Indiana, and her medical condition was an issue in the case.26 The
20

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
22
See Martin Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive
Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 35-41 (2008) (describing three
conceivable interpretations of the intersection of procedure and substance in the Enabling Act). The
Enabling Act also authorizes the creation of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Evidence, but my
focus in this article will be on the Civil Rules.
23
Justices on all sides of the debate cite to the same limited number of core cases to support their
contradictory views. The various opinions in Shady Grove discuss all of these cases.
24
Sibbach, 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
25
I say “arguably,” not because the state law in question was unclear, but because it was not clear which
state law applied, and of the two possible candidates, only one prohibited the physical exam. See note 28
infra.
26
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6.
21

4

defendant moved for an order requiring the plaintiff to submit to a medical examination
and the district court granted the motion.27 The plaintiff refused to submit to the
examination, however, arguing that it would invade her substantive right of bodily
integrity under Illinois law.28 The district court held the plaintiff in contempt for
violating its order, the plaintiff appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the contempt
order.29 The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit on grounds unrelated to the
Rule 35 issue,30 but also held that Rule 35 was valid, and affirmed the district court’s
order requiring the plaintiff to submit to the examination.31
Writing for a five person majority, Justice Stanley Roberts asked whether Rule 35
was “within the mandate of Congress to this Court [in the Enabling Act]” to create
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.32 After finding two Conformity Act precedents not
dispositive,33 the Court described itself as “thrown back . . . to the arguments drawn from
the language of the [Enabling] Act.”34 In parsing that language it discussed the “practice
and procedure” requirement now in subsection (a) of the Act and the “not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right” prohibition now in subsection (b), as if they
were a single, one-part standard.35 For a Rule to be valid, the Court said, in language that
has carried down to the present day, “[t]he test must be whether a rule really regulates
procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law.”36 If it does, the Rule is valid, and if it also is pertinent, the court must apply it.37
The Court did not explain its use of the euphonious adverb “really,”38 and the
word does not have an obvious meaning in an Enabling Act context. For example, is a

27

Id.
The plaintiff’s cause of action was governed by Indiana substantive law (because her claim arose in
Indiana), and Indiana law permitted a compulsory physical exam. To avoid this, the plaintiff argued that
she had an “important and substantial” right under Illinois procedural rules not to be compelled to submit to
such an exam and that the federal court had to apply the Illinois procedural rule under the command of the
Conformity Act. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6-7, 10-11.
29
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 7.
30
The Court held that Rule 37 did not permit the use of the contempt sanction for a refusal to submit to a
physical exam under Rule 35. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 16.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 9.
33
The Enabling Act had replaced the Conformity Act seven years earlier. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10. See
also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1176-77 (1982).
34
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13.
35
See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10-15. (“The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure, the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”) At the time of Sibbach, the two provisions were both in
section (a) of the Enabling Act. Section (b) of the Act at that time preserved the right to a jury trial in
actions at law. See Burbank, supra note 33, at 1108.
36
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
37
See id.
38
The Yuppie social class made “really” a popular colloquialism in the 1980s, Yuppie, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuppie, and the term is still used today. See, e.g., The Strangerhood,
ROOSTERTEETH PRODUCTIONS, http://roosterteeth.com/archive/?id=85&v=more (last visited Apr. 20, 2016)
(Dr. Cornelius Chambers Esquire, the Third, PhD, a character in the machinima series The Strangerhood,
frequently says, “I mean, really!” when annoyed). The word also is listed in that popular repository of
28
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Rule with substantive and procedural dimensions “really” substantive or “really”
procedural? Is a procedural purpose enough to make a Rule “really” procedural, or is a
procedural effect required as well? If a procedural purpose or effect is enough by itself,
must that purpose or effect be the Rule’s principal purpose or effect, or is a secondary or
incidental purpose or effect enough? These questions, and others like them, arise
inevitably when one tries to use the cryptic “really regulates procedure” phrase to
determine the validity of a Federal Rule, but the Court said nothing in Sibbach about how
to answer them.
Had it been forced to consider the question, the Court probably would have
agreed with later commentators and courts that a Rule need not be exclusively procedural
to be valid under the Enabling Act (it is difficult to make a rule that is exclusively
procedural), it is enough that it have some significant procedural dimension, or (as Justice
Harlan famously put it in a later case), that it is “rationally capable” of being classified as
procedural.”39 The Court seemed to agree that if a Rule had only an insubstantial or
incidental effect on substantive rights it would not abridge those rights, and thus would
not violate the second part of the Act’s standard.40 If it were otherwise, few Federal
Rules would be valid, since almost all procedural rules have some incidental effects on
substantive law.41 To be valid under the Act, insofar as the Court explained it in Sibbach,
therefore, a Federal Rule need only avoid creating a “rule of decision,” a rule for
resolving the substantive merits of the legal claims in dispute.42 If it does this, as Rule 35
did, the Rule is valid.43
The Sibbach majority supported its reading of the Enabling Act with three
arguments. The first, what one might think of as an ex cathedra textualist claim,44
declared that the Act’s prohibition on abridging “substantive rights” was “confined to”
(or “embraced”) only rights “protected and enforced in accordance with the adjective law
modern culture, the Urban Dictionary. Really, URBAN DICTIONARY,
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=really (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
39
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
40
See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13-16 (describing how it was unnecessary to discuss Rule 35’s effect on the
state’s rights in question); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464-65.
41
See, e.g. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465 (quoting Mississippi Publishing Corp., v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445
(1946)).
42
See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10-11.
43
See id. at 16. Like Justice Potter Stewart and pornography, Justice Roberts seemed to believe that he
knew a rule of practice and procedure when he saw it. Most Justices do not talk that way anymore. Cf.
Bauer, supra note 19, at 974 (“[T]he [Shady Grove] plurality’s ‘test’ of ‘procedure’ was so imprecise that it
reminds one of Justice Stewart’s definition of obscenity—‘I know it when I see it.’”).
44
Think of ex cathedra textualism as a form of interpretation that, like the Catholic Church’s doctrine of
infallibility, grounds the force of a pronouncement, interpretive or otherwise, on the authority of the
speaker. Ex Cathedra, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ex%20cathedra (defining ex cathedra); What Does the Term Ex Cathedra Mean
and Where Did the Catholic Church Come Up with it?, CATHOLIC ANSWERS,
http://www.catholic.com/quickquestions/what-does-the-term-ex-cathedra-mean-and-where-did-thecatholic-church-come-up-with-it (same). Justice Scalia used to be the most accomplished practitioner of the
method (the title to his book on statutory interpretation suggests that he might have agreed; reduced to an
acronym, it reads A Moi. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997), but now that he has
died, Justice Alito is likely to be the method’s most accomplished practitioner.
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of judicial procedure.”45 While no doubt true, this attempt at a definition was not very
helpful. It said, in effect, that substantive rights were rights enforced by procedural
rights, but substantive and procedural rights are mutually exclusive categories by
definition and describing one as not the other is question begging. The Court needed to
define the concept of substantive rights in positive terms for the expression to have
meaning (a task subsequent commentators have shown is possible46), and its failure to do
that introduced a confusion into Enabling Act jurisprudence that has lingered to the
present day.
The Court majority rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the term “substantive
rights” was a synonym for “important and substantial rights theretofore recognized.”47
Interpreting the Act in that way, it said, would result in endless litigation and confusion
as courts tried to differentiate between important and unimportant rights. 48 That
difficulty notwithstanding, the Court quickly added that the right to be free from a
physical examination was not more important than many other rights and thus not
substantive under even the plaintiff’s definition of the term.49 A Federal Rule is valid
under the Enabling Act, the Court repeated, if it “really regulates procedure.” That is all
you can know, and all you need to know.
The Court’s second argument to support the “really procedural” paraphrase of the
Enabling Act’s validity standard was purposivist more than textualist.50 The Enabling
Act, it said, authorized the creation of Rules designed to promote the “speedy, fair and
exact determination of the truth,” and a rule providing for a compulsory medical

Roberts gave “the right not to be injured in one’s person by another’s negligence” as an example of a
substantive law. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13.
46
See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (“the proper line of approach in determining whether [a state rule is]
substantive . . . is . . . by inquiring if the . . . rule would substantially affect those primary decisions
respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation”) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 726 (1974) (adding state
laws regulating status, and states of mind to Harlan’s idea of “primary” conduct); Redish & Murashko,
supra note 22, at 58-66 (describing various ways to interpret the substantive rights language of the
Enabling Act); Burbank & Wolff, supra note 19, at 47 (“[T]he grant of rulemaking power did not extend to
‘matters involving substantive legal and remedial rights affected by the considerations of public policy.’”
(quoting Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68—Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 425, 433 (1986))); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 442 n.2
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (substantive law can include a rule that is “undeniably procedural in the
ordinary sense of the term . . . [but which is] so bound up with the state-created right or remedy that it
defines the scope of that substantive right or remedy”).
47
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11, 13.
48
Id. at 13-14.
49
Id. at 14.
50
The argument was purposivist in the sense that Justice Roberts attributed reasonable purposes to the Act
rather than deduced purposes from the statements of legislators made during the enactment process. See
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14-15. Purposivism usually is associated with the Legal Process school of
interpretation at Harvard Law School in the nineteen fifties and sixties, and while the Legal Process school
did not emerge as a full blown view until after the decision in Sibbach, its methods were in circulation at
the time Roberts wrote.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 228-29 (2006) (describing purposivist interpretation and its connection to the Legal
Process school).
45

7

examination, such as Rule 35, “comport[s] with this policy.”51 This was uncontroversial
as a description of the Act’s purpose, but the connection between that purpose and a
compulsory medical examination rule needed more of an explanation. Not all rules that
accelerate litigation or promote the discovery of truth are authorized by the Enabling Act;
there are countervailing substantive concerns, both federal and state, to be considered.
But the Court did not discuss these concerns or take them into account. Instead, it
seemed to assume that furthering any procedural purpose, however minimal, was enough
to bring a Federal Rule within the ambit of the Act’s authorization. That was the issue to
be decided in Sibbach, however, not one to be assumed away.
The Court concluded its brief discussion of the Act by adding an intentionalist
argument to the textualist and purposivist ones just described.52 Pointing to a House
Committee Report on the Bill that became the Enabling Act, and to the Notes of the
Advisory Committee on the Rules on which the House Committee Report was based, it
argued that Congress was aware of Rule 35’s compulsory medical examination provision
when it reviewed the draft Federal Rules and did not delete the provision in approving the
Draft.53 Gilding the lily a little, it also added that Congress knew that the right to a
compulsory medical examination had been different under the Conformity Act, the
Enabling Act’s predecessor,54 and yet, in a “dog did not bark fashion,”55 it permitted a
change in that practice to go into effect. From this inaction, the Court concluded, it was
51

Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 50, at 221-30 (describing the differences between intentionalist and
purposivist interpretation).
53
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 15. Justice Scalia would have been the first to denounce reliance on committee
reports as a source of statutory meaning. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[W]e are a Government of laws, not of committee reports.”).
54
See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 12-13.
55
The Sir Arthur Conan Doyle story Silver Blaze inspired the expression. The story is about the
disappearance of a famous racehorse and the apparent murder of its trainer on the eve of an important race.
In the story Sherlock Holmes is able to identify the “agent” responsible for the trainer’s death, in part, by
noticing something that did not happen. Here is Dr. Watson’s description of Holmes pointing out the
importance of the non-event to a Scotland Yard inspector.
As we stepped into the carriage one of the stable-lads held the door open for us. A sudden idea
seemed to occur to Holmes, for he leaned forward and touched the lad upon the sleeve.
“You have a few sheep in the paddock,” he said. “Who attends to them?”
“I do, sir.”
“Have you noticed anything amiss with them of late?”
“Well, sir, not of much account, but three of them have gone lame, sir.”
I could see that Holmes was extremely pleased, for he chuckled and rubbed his hands together.
“A long shot, Watson, a very long shot,” said he, pinching my arm. “Gregory, let me recommend
to your attention this singular epidemic among the sheep. Drive on, coachman!”
Colonel Ross still wore an expression that showed the poor opinion which he had formed of my
companion’s ability, but I saw by the inspector’s face that his attention had been keenly aroused.
“You consider that to be important?” he asked. “Exceedingly so.”
“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 16-17 (Dover Thrift
Editions 2010) (1895).
52
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fair to infer that Congress intended to authorize the creation of a compulsory medical
examination rule under the authority of the Enabling Act.56
At no time did the Court discuss explicitly whether the Enabling Act articulated a
one- or two-part validity standard. Perhaps it believed it was not possible for a Rule that
“really regulates procedure” to have more than an incidental or insubstantial effect on
substantive rights, and thus not possible for it to “abridge, enlarge or modify” such rights.
If so, it would not matter whether the standard had one or two parts, since the analysis
would come out the same either way.57 Answering the “one- or-two part standard”
question is necessary only if a Federal Rule that “really regulates procedure” also has
more than an incidental or insubstantial effect on substantive rights, and the Court in
Sibbach decided that Rule 35 did not have that effect. In retrospect, however, the Court’s
failure to discuss the issue, even to dismiss it as unnecessary to the decision, was illadvised, since it left future federal courts (including future Supreme Courts) free to
conclude with equal legitimacy that Sibbach either had settled the question, or that it had
left it open for another day.
While the Sibbach majority failed to take up the “one- or two-part standard” issue
explicitly, Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion did, albeit in a somewhat indirect and
oblique manner, and that dissent has important lessons for modern day Enabling Act
analysis. Justice Frankfurter argued that Rule 35 was invalid because it violated a federal
policy protecting the “inviolability of the person” articulated in the Conformity Act era
case of Union Pacific v. Botsford.58 That federal policy, he said, had historic roots in
Anglo-American law and could not be curtailed “unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.”59 A change in a policy so “touching the sensibilities of people or even
their prejudices as to privacy,” he argued, “ought not to be inferred from a general
authorization to formulate rules for the more uniform and effective dispatch of business
on the civil side of the federal courts.”60 An “invasion of the person,” he continued,
“stand[s] on a very different footing from questions pertaining to the discovery of
documents, pre-trial procedure and other devices for the expeditious, economic and fair
conduct of litigation.”61 He attached little significance to the fact that Congress did not
delete the physical examination provision before approving the draft Rules. The “Rules
are not acts of Congress,” he said, and “can not be treated as such. . . . [T]o draw any
56

Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 15-16. It is difficult, if not impossible, to deduce a motive for acting from a failure
to act, of course, but judges from all points on the political spectrum seem to like to do it nonetheless. See,
e.g., Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 547 U.S. 9, 20 (2006); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of
Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2007).
57
Professor Burbank concludes that the “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right” provision was a
redundancy and not intended to be an independent part of the Enabling Act’s validity standard. See
Burbank, supra note 33, at 1108. Not everyone agrees with his interpretation of the Act. See Redish &
Murashko, supra note 22, at 67-77 (describing “Burbank’s Mistakes in Interpreting the Rules Enabling
Act”).
58
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 17-18 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting). See also Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 252 (1891).
59
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 17 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
60
Id. at 18. The “ought not to be inferred” phrasing seems to acknowledge that the Act could be interpreted
in more than one way.
61
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 18.
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inference of tacit approval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality.”62 The
change effected by Rule 35, he said, “would require explicit legislation.”63
Frankfurter saw Sibbach as a separation of powers case, and Rule 35 as invalid
because it invaded the lawmaking power of Congress.64 Even though he did not say so,
Frankfurter had to assume that the Enabling Act’s “abridge substantive rights”
prohibition was a separate and independent part of the test for the validity of a Federal
Rule. It was clear that Rule 35 regulated practice and procedure, and if that by itself was
enough to satisfy the Enabling Act’s validity standard, he would have had to conclude
that the Rule was valid. Only if the Act articulated a two-part validity standard did his
argument make sense. The Sibbach majority disagreed with Frankfurter about the
validity of Rule 35 and its disagreement might have been based on the assumption that
the Enabling Act validity standard had only one part, that a Federal Rule was valid if it
was a rule of “practice and procedure.” But the majority also did not say this and its
failure to do so makes it impossible to know the extent to which it considered and
resolved the “one or two part standard” issue.
The decision in Sibbach was based on policy considerations as well as statutory
language. The Justices disagreed, for example, about whether the interest in the uniform
application of the Federal Rules was superior to the interest in protecting legislative
prerogatives. If the Federal Rules were to have the same meaning everywhere, federal
and state legislative enactments sometimes would have to give way. And if legislative
enactments were to be given full force and effect Federal Rules would not have the same
meaning everywhere.65
It was not possible to protect both interests equally.
Unfortunately, the Sibbach opinion failed to discuss this policy issue in any detail,
making it impossible to determine just how large a role it played in the Court’s analysis.66
In the end, Sibbach combined a question-begging textualist rationale with perfunctory
intentionalist and incomplete purposivist ones, to justify an ex cathedra pronouncement
about the meaning of statutory text, expressed in the quaint argot of Yuppiespeak, while
simultaneously giving short shrift to the policy concerns that underlay the debate over the
text’s meaning. These are not the qualities of a “final word” on the subject.
The Supreme Court returned to the task of parsing the Enabling Act infrequently
over the next few years, and added little of significance to Sibbach when it did. As a
consequence, the “really regulates procedure” paraphrase became a kind of default
statement of the Enabling Act’s validity standard for many Justices on the Court,67

62

Id.
Id.
64
See id. at 17-18.
65
This was one of Justice Scalia’s principle arguments in Shady Grove. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. 393, 41112 (2010).
66
Justice Stevens later argued that Sibbach failed to discuss the issue because the parties in the case did not
raise it. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 427-28 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. 393, 407 (describing the “single criterion” test as something the Court has
“long held.”).
63
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though a close examination of the case law will show this view to be more old than
venerable.68
2) Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree
The Court’s first, extensive, post-Sibbach discussion of the Enabling Act’s
validity standard, in Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,69 also continues to play
an important role in the interpretation of the Act.70 In Murphree, the Court was asked to
reconcile the service of process provision of Federal Rule 4 with Mississippi personal
jurisdiction law. The plaintiff filed the action in the Northern District of Mississippi and
served the defendant in the Southern District, where it had its principal place of business
and a registered agent.71 The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that
Mississippi law did not provide for personal jurisdiction in the Southern District and that
permitting service there amounted to a modification of state personal jurisdiction law in
violation of Federal Rule 82.72 The Supreme Court held for the plaintiff, finding that
Rule 4 “did not affect . . . jurisdiction . . . but was intended . . . to provide a procedural
means of bringing [a] defendant before the court” when the defendant otherwise was
subject to the court’s jurisdiction.73 As such, it did not conflict with Rule 82’s
prohibition on extending personal jurisdiction.
The Murphree Court discussed the Enabling Act briefly, in a single paragraph at
the end of its opinion, to make two points, one uncontroversial and the other
unsubstantiated. It repeated Sibbach’s familiar nostrum that “Congress’s prohibition of
any alteration of substantive rights . . . was obviously not addressed to . . . incidental
effects . . . upon the rights of litigants who . . . have been brought before a court
authorized to determine their rights,”74 and also concluded that Rule 4 did “not abridge,
enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which [the district] court will adjudicate [the
defendant’s] rights,” because the Rule related “merely to ‘the manner and the means by

68

See Redish & Murashko, supra note 22, at 74-76 (describing the post-Sibbach legislative history of the
Enabling Act); Burbank & Wolff, supra note 19, at 52 (arguing the Court’s 1988 amendments to the
Enabling Act were an attempt to provide a standard more faithful to both the Act’s original understanding
and its evolving needs).
69
326 U.S. 438 (1946).
70
Shady Grove relies heavily on Murphree in its interpretation of the Enabling Act. Shady Grove, 559 U.S.
407.
71
See Murphree, 326 U.S. at 439-40. At the time, Rule 4 authorized service of process “anywhere within
the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held” when “the state embraces two or more
[judicial] districts.” Id. at 443. Mississippi state law provided for personal jurisdiction wherever a
defendant had an agent for receipt of service of process. Id. at 442.
72
See Murphree, 326 U.S. at 443-46. At the time, Rule 82 provided that the Federal Rules “shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States.” Murphree, 326 U.S.
at 443.
73
See Murphree, 326 U.S. at 444-46. Mississippi law provided for personal jurisdiction wherever the
defendant had an agent for receipt of service, but the defendant argued that the statute did not apply in
federal court. The Supreme Court held otherwise. See Murphree, 326 U.S. at 443. See note 79 infra, and
accompanying text.
74
Id. at 445.
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which a right to recover . . . [would be] enforced.’”75 Thus, the Court said, Rule 4 was “a
rule of procedure and not of substantive right, and [was] not subject to the prohibition of
the Enabling Act.”76
Some read these brief comments to mean that the Court adopted the “single
criterion” view of the Enabling Act validity standard,77 but the Murphree opinion as a
whole paints a slightly different picture. While the Court did say that Rule 4 did not
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right, it did so gratuitously, under
circumstances in which there was no state substantive right to abridge.78 The Court had
eliminated any potential conflict between Rule 4 and state law when it held that
appointing an agent for receipt of service of process under state law operated as consent
to jurisdiction in both state and federal court, and not just state court as the defendant had
argued.79 Thus interpreted, state law did not conflict with Rule 4 and the two rules could
be applied in combination, with Rule 4 controlling the issue of service.
Given the absence of any direct collision between state and federal law, the
Court’s quotation of Sibbach’s “incidental effects” and “manner and means” language
was the statement of abstract principles more than a legal conclusion necessary to the
decision in the case. The statement that Rule 4 “does not operate to abridge, enlarge or
modify the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [the plaintiff’s] rights,”80
was even more confusing. It mixed Rules of Decision Act language (“rules of decision”)
with Enabling Act language (“abridge, enlarge or modify”), to make a point required by
neither Act.81 The Court appeared to be quoting language for the sake of quoting it,
rather than expressing a reasoned conclusion about the validity of Federal Rule 4. Given
these confusions, the Murphree opinion left all of the hard Enabling Act issues right
where it found them—unresolved.
3) Hanna v. Plumer

75

Id. at 446 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).
Id.
77
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. 393, 413 n.12 (2010).
78
See Murphree, 326 U.S. at 445-46. Unlike in Sibbach, there also was no federal substantive right in
Murphree with which Rule 4 might conflict. The personal jurisdictional authority of the federal court was
based on state law.
79
Murphree, 326 U.S. at 443.
80
Id. at 445-46.
81
“Rules of decision” is a synonym for “substantive law” in a Decision Act context, see Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (substantive law of the state the “rules of decision” for federal courts sitting
in diversity under the Rules of Decision Act), but as Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), makes clear,
the Rules of Decision Act and Rules Enabling Act define “substantive” differently, id. at 471 (“The line
between substance and procedure shifts as the legal context changes. . . . both the Enabling Act and the Erie
rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply state ‘substantive’ law and federal ‘procedural’ law, but
from that it need not follow that the tests are identical.”), so the Court’s use of Decision Act terminology in
an Enabling Act context was confusing.
76

12

The Court’s most extensive discussion of the Enabling Act’s validity standard
after Sibbach came in the celebrated case of Hanna v. Plumer,82 but here too, the Court
failed to say whether the standard had one or two parts. Hanna involved a dispute over
the adequacy of service of process. Unlike Sibbach and Murphree, it also involved a
direct collision between a Federal Rule and a state law. The plaintiff had served the
defendant by leaving copies of a summons and complaint with the defendant’s wife at the
family residence as authorized by then-Federal Rule 4(d)(1).83 Massachusetts State law,
on the other hand, required that the defendant be served “in hand”;84 “usual place of
abode” service was not adequate.85 The defendant argued that state law governed the
issue of service and moved for summary judgment based on the lack of adequate service.
The district court granted the motion, and the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the
dispute involved “a substantive rather than a procedural matter” and that, as such, Erie
(i.e., the Rules of Decision Act), required the application of state law.86 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed.87
The Court began its analysis by finding Rule 4 pertinent to the issue in dispute.88
The issue was adequacy of service and Rule 4 provided the federal standard for service of
process. The Rule also passed muster as a rule of practice and procedure under
82

380 U.S. 460 (1965). None of the Enabling Act cases between Hanna and Shady Grove make any
fundamental changes in Hanna’s interpretation of the Act. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
presented the Court with an opportunity to do so, but only Justice Scalia thought the Enabling Act issue in
that case was worth discussing, see Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415, 468 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and
Justice Ginsburg dismissed his argument in a footnote. See id. at 437 n.22 (majority opinion).
83
At the time, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provided:
Service shall be made as follows: (1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an
incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him
personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein . . . .
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461. The Rule has been amended substantially since then.
84
See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 197, § 9 (1958) (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 197, § 9 (2004)).
At the time, the law provided, in relevant part, that:
[A]n executor or administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the
deceased which is not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond for
the performance of his trust, . . . unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such
action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator . . . .
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462.
85
Id. at 461-62.
86
See Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964). The First Circuit opinion in Hanna did not cite
to Erie, but it based its decision on the fact that, as it puts it, “we are concerned with a substantive rather
than procedural matter,” found the Massachusetts state statute substantive, and cited to the Cohen and
Ragan cases (rather than Erie) for authority. Id. Cohen was grounded on Erie, see Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-57 (1949), and Ragan distinguished itself from Erie, since it
involved a Federal Rule and thus raised an issue under the Rules Enabling Act rather than the Rules of
Decision Act. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 530, 553 (1949).
87
380 U.S. at 464. The Court divided its discussion into three distinct sections. The first expressed its
principal Enabling Act analysis, id. at 464-65, the second explained why Erie did not govern the issue, id.
at 469-72, and the third returned to the Enabling Act analysis to make minor changes in the description of
the Act’s validity standard. Id. at 472-74. Hanna is perhaps best known for its refinement of the outcome
determination test for the Rules of Decision Act, but for our purposes, its Enabling Act analysis is more
important.
88
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464-65.
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subsection (a) of the Enabling Act since it defined the notice obligation for commencing
a lawsuit, said nothing about how to resolve the substantive issues in dispute, and had no
continuing effect in a lawsuit once it was complied with.89 Its principal purpose and
effect were procedural, in other words, and that made it “rationally capable of
classification” as procedural.90
At that point, the Court should have turned its attention to subsection (b) of the
Enabling Act and asked whether the defendant’s right to in-hand service under
Massachusetts law was substantive, and if yes, whether the application of Rule 4 would
abridge that right; but it did not do this. Instead, it found that the differences between the
state and federal service rules were not substantial enough to cause Rule 4 to “abridge”
the rights created by the Massachusetts statute, whatever their nature.91 Consequently,
Rule 4 did not “exceed[] the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act .
. . and [was] . . . the standard against which the District Court should have measured the
adequacy of the service.”92 In a sense, the Court treated the Enabling Act’s validity
standard as having two parts, but found the second part satisfied under its “abridgement”
rather than “substantive rights” component. The Court did not say this explicitly,
however, leaving future courts free to decide for themselves whether the Court
considered the question of whether the Enabling Act’s validity standard had one or two
parts.93 For all of its extended discussion of the Enabling Act’s text, Hanna did little to
clear up the lingering confusion over the Act’s central unresolved issue: whether its
validity standard had one or two parts.

Id. (Rule 4 “does not operate to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which [the] court will
adjudicate [petitioner’s] rights.)
90
See id. at 472.
91
Hanna has been criticized for using the similarity of the state and federal service rules as an excuse for
passing on the opportunity to say whether section (b) of the Enabling Act articulated an independent test for
determining the validity of the Federal Rule, and a fortiori, for failing to define the concept “substantive
rights” referred to in that section, see Ely, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 46, at 720-21, and there may be
merit to the criticism. The differences between the two rules were enough to change the outcome in the
case. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465-66. On the other hand, while Professor Ely has argued that the
Massachusetts statute did not create substantive rights, Ely, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 46, at 733-37,
others have disagreed. See Abram Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 751-52 (1974), and the
issue is far from easy.
92
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464.
93
There might be situations in which it is not possible to avoid the question of whether the Enabling Act
validity standard has one or two parts. The case law does not provide a ready example, but it is possible to
imagine one. Consider a variation on the Hanna facts in which Massachusetts has a statute prohibiting
litigation-related activity of any kind from being conducted in a person’s home. Assume that the statute
was passed to protect the privacy of home life and that Massachusetts considered privacy a substantive
right. (Such a statute might insulate Massachusetts citizens who never left home from being sued, but the
Commonwealth might think this possibility so unlikely as not to pose a significant risk to any important
state interest.) In such a circumstance, Rule 4 still would qualify as a rule of “practice and procedure”
under section (a) of the Enabling Act, but now it also would have more than an insubstantial or incremental
effect on a conflicting state right; it would destroy that right completely. If the Enabling Act is read
literally, a court faced with such a situation would need to determine if section (b) of the Act states a
separate and independent part of the test for determining the validity of a Federal Rule, and if it does,
whether a state privacy right is substantive in the sense that term is used in the Enabling Act (since a state
legislature cannot define the meaning of a federal law).
89
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4) Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.
The next important case to interpret the Enabling Act,94 Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp.,95 also failed to resolve the “one- or two-part validity standard” issue, but for a
different reason.96 Walker involved a dispute over when an action was commenced for
state statute of limitations purposes. The state law in Walker provided that an action was
commenced upon service of process, but Federal Rule 3 provided that it was commenced
upon filing.97 The plaintiff filed his case, but did not serve the defendant, within the state
limitations period,98 and the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that state law
controlled. Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed, holding that Rule 3 was not intended
“to toll a state statute of limitations, much less . . . to displace state tolling rules . . . it
simply governs the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules
begin to run . . . .”99 Thus interpreted, the “scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as
[the plaintiff] urged,”100 and, “there being no Federal Rule [governing] the point in
dispute, Erie command[ed] the enforcement of state law.”101
Walker was a pertinence case, not an Enabling Act one, notwithstanding that the
validity of a Federal Rule seemed to be one of the issues in dispute. When the Court held
that Rule 3 did not define commencement of an action for statute of limitations purposes,
however, it took the issue of the Rule’s validity off the table.102 There was no need to
examine that question if the Rule did not apply to any issue before the court. Thus
resolved, Walker added nothing to Enabling Act analysis. Some commentators question
the Court’s good faith in deciding Walker on a pertinence ground, arguing that such a
narrow reading of Rule 3 was inconsistent with the Court’s expansive reading of Rule 4

94

Shady Grove includes Walker in the list of cases it uses to interpret the Enabling Act. See Shady Grove
559 U.S. at 421-22.
95
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980). Walker was a clone of Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). The Supreme Court called the two cases
“indistinguishable,” in part because the “predecessor to the Oklahoma statute [in Walker] was derived
from the predecessor to the Kansas statute in Ragan.” Walker, 446 U.S. at 748. Ordinarily one would not
expect to find identical cases in the Supreme Court only thirty years apart, but many thought Hanna had
overruled Ragan. Walker made it clear that it did not. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50.
96
Walker also is important for its contribution to the question of whether the Federal Rules should be read
narrowly to avoid conflicts with state law. Justice Ginsburg adopted this view in Shady Grove, but the
Court in Walker rejected the idea and said the Rules should be given their ordinary meaning. See Walker,
446 U.S. at 750 n.9.
97
See Walker, 446 U.S. at 742.
98
Id. at 742-43. The statute permitted the defendant to be served within sixty days of filing, even if
outside the applicable limitations period. Id. at 743. See also Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531 n.4 (interpretation
of an identical commencement of the action statute).
99
Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51.
100
Id. at 750.
101
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470). Id. at 752 (“Since there is no direct
conflict between the Federal Rule and the state law, the Hanna analysis does not apply.”).
102
See, e.g., Walker, at 752 n.14 (“Since we hold that Rule 3 does not apply, it is unnecessary for us to
address the second question posed by the Hanna analysis: whether Rule 3, if it applied, would be outside
the scope of the Rules Enabling Act or beyond the power of Congress under the Constitution.”).
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in Hanna,103 but this criticism is unwarranted. Finding that Rule 4 did not govern service
of process in Hanna would have read Rule 4 out of existence. The Rule had no purpose
other than to regulate service. But Rule 3 had a life as a timing rule, both for other parts
of the Federal Rules and perhaps federal statutes of limitations,104 independently of
whether it defined commencement of an action for state statute of limitations purposes.
That fact, combined with the Court’s legitimate concern about modifying state
substantive law through a Federal Rule (statutes of limitations are substantive under the
Rules of Decision Act),105 was more than enough to establish the reasonableness of the
Court’s view.106
5) Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods107 is the last in the line of cases cited
in Shady Grove to support the “single criterion” view of the Enabling Act’s validity
standard. That case, like Hanna, involved a direct collision between state and federal
law. A district court jury awarded the plaintiffs $300,000 for injuries sustained in a
motorcycle accident, the defendants appealed the verdict, and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed it.108 The plaintiffs (respondents on appeal) moved for the imposition of a
mandatory ten percent affirmance penalty required by Alabama state law.109 The
defendant Railroad (petitioner on appeal) objected, arguing that the award of a penalty on
appeal was governed by Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and that
Rule 38 provided for a discretionary penalty only if the appeal was frivolous.110 The
Eleventh Circuit held that state law, not Rule 38, governed the issue, and imposed a ten
percent penalty on the Railroad.111 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Rule 38
governed because the Rule was valid under the Enabling Act, and because it occupied the
same field of operation as the Alabama law, it pre-empted the state law.112
The Rule’s purpose, the Court said, was “to penalize frivolous appeals and
appeals interposed for delay”113 and this made it “rationally capable of classification as
[procedural],”114 under the “practice and procedure” requirement of subsection (a) of the
103

See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 439 (11th ed. 2013)
(“Why is Rule 4 read broadly, making a clash with state law ‘unavoidable,’ while Rule 3 is read to
incorporate an implied exception for state statutes?”).
104
The Court withheld judgment on the latter issue. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 752 n.14.
105
See Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 110-11.
106
The Advisory Committee Notes on the Rules raised the question of whether Rule 3 should be read to toll
a state statute of limitations, but expressed no opinion on how it should be resolved. See Walker, 446 U.S.
at 750 n.10.
107
Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
108
Id. at 2.
109
Id. at 3.
110
Id. at 4.
111
Id. at 3.
112
See id. at 7-8.
113
Id. at 4.
114
Id. at 5. The “rationally capable” standard is the test for determining the validity of a federal statute
under the Judiciary Article of the Constitution, not the validity of a Federal Rule under the Enabling Act.
See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31-32 (1998) (describing how a federal statute is tested
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Enabling Act. If the Court thought the Act’s validity standard had only one part it would
have stopped there, but it did not. Instead, it went on to find that “the Rules Enabling Act
. . . contains an additional requirement,” that a “Federal Rule must not ‘abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right.’”115 The characterization of this requirement as
“additional” seemed to acknowledge that the Enabling Act standard had two parts, that it
was not reducible to a “really regulates procedure” paraphrase, but like Enabling Act
cases before it, Burlington Northern failed to say this explicitly and thus left the issue still
in doubt.
The Court then combined an “incidental effects” argument reminiscent of the
discussion in Hanna116 with a policy argument reminiscent of Sibbach,117 to avoid
examining the nature of the right created by the Alabama law. 118 Rule 38, the Court
acknowledged, had an incidental effect on the state law right, but this was acceptable
under the Enabling Act because the effect was an inevitable consequence of the uniform
application of the Federal Rules.119 In effect, the court read an exception into the
Enabling Act rather than defined its terms narrowly, as in Hanna,120 but the difference
between the two moves was cosmetic more than substantive, since the result in both cases
was to interpret the Act to mean less than it said. The Court’s failure to say definitively
whether the Act’s validity standard had one or two parts continued the Court’s past
practice of equivocating on that issue, and left Burlington Northern somewhat limited as
an Enabling Act precedent.
Enabling Act decisions after Burlington Northern do not add much to the
preceding story. Most deal with unusual fact situations, narrowly defined legal issues, or
idiosyncratic disagreements over pertinence, and as a result, have limited implications for
interpreting the Act. The cases now contain so many distinctive perspectives, in fact, that
it is difficult to know which justices believe what with respect to the Act’s validity
standard. The case law does not lack for authorial firepower—many highly regarded
directly against the constitution to determine if it comes within a grant of federal legislative power). The
mistake was harmless, however, since the Judiciary Article and section (a) of the Enabling Act use the
same language and have been interpreted to mean the same thing.
115
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072).
116
Id. at 5 (“The Rules Enabling Act, however, contains an additional requirement. The Federal Rule must
not ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. . . .’ 28 U.S.C §2072. The cardinal purpose of
Congress in authorizing the development of a uniform and consistent system of rules governing federal
practice and procedure suggests that Rules which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not
violate this provision if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules.”); See
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465 (“Congress’ prohibition of any alteration of substantive rights of litigants was
obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new
rules of procedure . . . .” (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1941).).
117
See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14 (arguing for an interpretation of the Enabling Act that avoids endless
litigation and confusion).
118
See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5-6.
119
See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5 (“Rules which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do
not violate this provision if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules [of
procedure].”).
120
In effect, it read section (b) of the Act to say: “Such rules shall not substantially abridge, enlarge or
modify substantive rights.”
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justices have taken a turn at parsing the Act121—and yet no one has been able to produce
the definitive interpretation needed to put the question of the Act’s meaning to rest.122
Perhaps the Court thought it was ready to announce such an interpretation when it took
certiorari in Shady Grove, but if so, it soon learned that not all expectations are realized.

III. SHADY GROVE
In a series of opinions produced by some moderately surprising alliances,123 only
one of which commanded five votes, the Shady Grove case separated the debate over the
meaning of the Enabling Act into three distinct sub-parts. The Justices disagreed over
whether to interpret the Act from a rule or policy perspective; if policy, what policy; and
if rule, what understanding of the rule. Justices Ginsburg, Scalia,124 and Stevens now
were the principal antagonists, and while the issues on which they disagreed were similar
to those separating Justices Roberts and Frankfurter in Sibbach (and the various other
Justices paired in the voting over the years), they also were different in significant
respects,. Unfortunately, these differences made the lines in the sand in Enabling Act
jurisprudence more pronounced than ever.125
The Shady Grove case itself involved a dispute over statutory interest on an
insurance subrogation claim.126 Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates provided medical
care to Sonia Galvez and as partial payment for that care Galvez assigned Shady Grove
her rights to reimbursement under an insurance policy issued by Allstate Insurance.
Shady Grove filed a claim on the policy and Allstate paid it, but not within the thirty days
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The list includes Justice Frankfurter in Sibbach (dissenting); Justice Stone in Murphree (majority
opinion); Justice Douglas in Ragan (majority opinion); Justices Warren (majority opinion) and Harlan
(concurring) in Hanna; Justice Marshall in Walker (majority opinion) and Burlington Northern (majority
opinion); Justice Ginsburg in Gasperini (majority opinion); and Justice Scalia in Gasperini (dissenting),
Semtek (majority opinion), and Shady Grove (majority opinion).
122
Legal scholars have made some efforts in this regard but with limited success. Professor Ely’s article,
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, see Ely, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 46, is the most well-known
examples. Most (though not all) major Procedure scholars approved of Ely’s basic framework for doing
Enabling Act analysis when he first articulated it, even though some disagreed about its application in
particular cases, but over the years his view gradually has lost favor. See Condlin, Formstone, supra note
3, at 476-80, 558-59 (describing the initial appeal and gradual decline in the popularity of Ely’s view).
123
The Shady Grove facts involved a “little guy-big guy,” “individual-corporation,” “states’ rights-federal
rights,” “plaintiff-defendant,” “democrat-republican” dispute, and Ginsburg and Scalia come down on the
opposite sides of what one would have predicted in each of these dichotomies. This makes it hard to
explain the decision as a consequence of a result-oriented jurisprudence. Something principled, or
confused, must be at the base of it. See Stempel, supra note 16, at 911 (“Shady Grove was . . . a wonderful
departure from the Court’s seemingly predictable ideological divide that has characterized other close cases
in recent years.”).
124
See note 15 supra.
125
See Clermont, supra note 19, at 1029 (Shady Grove’s “splintered opinions will lead lower court judges
for a while to see the doors [to accommodating the federalism and separation of powers issues in dispute]
as slightly ajar.”)
126
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2010).
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required by New York state law.127 This made Allstate liable for statutory interest under
another New York law, but the company refused to pay the interest.128 Shady Grove filed
a diversity action against Allstate in the Eastern District of New York, seeking to recover
the interest owed it and the class of all other health care providers Allstate had not paid in
time under the New York statute.129 The District Court refused to certify the class,
however, finding that yet another New York statute prohibited class actions in suits to
recover penalties, and that statutory interest was a penalty.130 The Court also dismissed
Shady Grove’s individual claim because it fell short of the amount in controversy
required for diversity jurisdiction.131 The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the New
York penalty statute created substantive rights under Erie and as such, had to be applied
by a federal court sitting in diversity.132 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed.133
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court.134 He began with the pertinence
issue, asking whether the New York penalty statute or Federal Rule 23 governed the issue
of class certification: Was there a direct collision between the two rules, he asked, so that
they could not be applied consistently with one another, or did they govern different
issues?135 The Second Circuit had thought the rules were compatible—that Rule 23
governed the issue of whether the class could be certified and the New York statute
governed the antecedent issue of whether a claim was eligible for class certification in the
first instance—but Justice Scalia dismissed this distinction as “entirely artificial.”136
127

Id. at 397. Professor Stempel has described the enactment of the New York statutory interest statute and
the purposes it was designed to serve in authoritative detail. See Stempel, supra note 16, at 932-67.
128
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 398, 416.
134
Justices Roberts, Stevens, Thomas, and Sotomayor joined with Scalia on Part I of the opinion
(describing the facts and procedural posture of the case), and part II-A (discussing whether Rule 23 was
pertinent to the issue in dispute). Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Sotomayor joined with him on Part II-B
(discussing whether the Enabling Act articulated a “single criterion” test for determining the validity of the
Federal Rules), and part II-D (discussing whether Rule 23 was valid), and Justices Roberts and Thomas
joined with him on Part II-C (responding to Justice Stevens’s conflicting interpretation of Sibbach). Justice
Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion providing the fifth vote for the Court’s judgment on the merits
in the case, and Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito joined.
There was no majority view on the question of whether the Enabling Act validity standard had one or two
parts, though Professor Roosevelt seems to believe otherwise. See Roosevelt, supra note 19, at 51 (“The
Justices split 5-4 over whether to give independent significance to the Rules Enabling Act’s ‘shall not
abridge’ language, with five agreeing that they should . . . .”). The citation he gives to support this
conclusion says only that “Federal Rules must be interpreted with some degree of ‘sensitivity to important
state interests and regulatory policies,’ . . . and applied to diversity cases against the background of
Congress’ command that such rules not alter substantive rights and with consideration of the ‘degree to
which the Rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow
in state courts.” This proposition, taken from Ginsburg’s dissent in Shady Grove, mixes and matches
Enabling Act and Rules of Decision Act language with federalism principles in a manner that makes it
difficult to determine precisely what point is being made.
135
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 396-99.
136
See id. at 399.
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Both rules, he argued, articulated “preconditions for maintaining a class action.”137
“Relabeling Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites as ‘eligibility criteria’ would obviate [the Court’s]
objection,” he said, but this was “a sure sign that [the] certifiability–eligibility distinction
[was] made-to-order.”138 In his view, it was not possible to apply both rules to the class
certification issue, one or the other had to control, and that one was Rule 23.
Justice Ginsburg disagreed, but for a different reason from that of the Second
Circuit.139 Rule 23, she argued, regulated “the procedural aspects of class litigation,” and
the New York statute regulated “the size of a monetary award a class plaintiff may
pursue.”140 One rule was about procedure and the other was about remedy, and as such,
the two rules could be applied compatibly with one another. The only question in the
case, as she saw it, was whether the “Erie doctrine”141 required the application of the
New York statute.142 For her, Shady Grove was a federalism case,143 and the Rules of
Decision Act, not the Enabling Act, was the controlling authority.144 She also agreed
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See id.
See id.
139
Ginsburg discussed the issue in terms of the “direct collision” language of Hanna, asking if the New
York and Federal rules inevitably conflicted, or whether they could be applied together. See Shady Grove,
559 U.S. at 438-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “Our decisions . . . caution us to ask, before undermining
state legislation: Is this conflict really necessary?” Id. at 437. She also invoked the narrow construction
principle disavowed by the Court in Walker, adding that if the Court “interpreted [Rule 23] with awareness
of, and sensitivity to, important state regulatory policies” the rules do not conflict. See id. at 437. But see
Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. 26 n.4 (“direct collision” not necessary for an Enabling Act problem). See
also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 742, 750 n.9 (1980) (disavowing the principle that a Federal
Rule must be construed narrowly to avoid a conflict with state law).
140
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. 446-47. Ginsburg based this characterization of the New York statute on
what she took to be its purpose. As she put it, “while phrased as responsive to the question whether certain
class actions may begin, § 901(b) is unmistakably aimed at controlling how those actions must end.” Id. at
450. The statute responds to the concern that allowing statutory damages to be awarded on a class-wide
basis would “produce overkill.” See id. at 444. Scalia countered with the well-known textualist argument
that a court must enforce a legislature’s actions, not its purposes. See id. at 403. As he put it, “[t]he
manner in which the law ‘could have been written,’ has no bearing; what matters is the law the Legislature
did enact.” Id. at 403 (majority opinion). He described the familiar catalogue of difficulties involved in
trying to ascertain legislative purpose and concluded that “whatever the policies [the New York statute and
Rule 23] pursue, they flatly contradict each other.” See id. at 405. But see Roosevelt, supra note 19, at 53
(“Scalia’s rather wooden textualism does not make much sense when trying to determine how a statute
should operate in contexts the lawmakers did not contemplate.”).
141
Presumably she meant Rules of Decision Act. The “Erie doctrine” is not a law. See note 216, infra.
142
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 437-38, and 452 (Ginsburg dissenting) (“I would decide this case by
inquiring ‘whether application of the [state] rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one
of both of the litigants that failure to [apply the state law] would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the
federal court.’”).
143
“By finding a conflict without considering whether Rule 23 rationally should be read to avoid any
collision, the Court unwisely and unnecessarily retreats from the federalism principles undergirding Erie.”
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 451 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144
See generally Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 443-45. This probably explains why Ginsburg began her
analysis by discussing the status of the New York statute rather than the validity of Rule 23. If Rule 23
was pertinent and valid it would not matter if the New York statute was a “rule of decision”—Rule 23
would govern. This is the same sequencing mistake she made in Gasperini. See Condlin, Formstone,
supra note 3, at 527-28 (describing the illogical sequence of Ginsburg’s analysis in Gasperini).
138
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with the Second Circuit that the New York penalty statute was substantive and that, under
Erie, the district court had to apply it.145
Justice Scalia rejected this procedure–remedy distinction as peremptorily as he
had rejected the Second Circuit’s eligibility–certifiability one before it because, as he put
it, regulating remedy is “not what [the New York statute] does.”146 By its own terms, he
said, “the [statute] precludes a plaintiff from maintaining a class action . . . [it says]
nothing about what remedies a court may award.”147 The state statute, he continued,
“prevents the class actions it covers from coming into existence at all,”148 and because of
this, the conflict between the state rule and the Federal Rule was unavoidable; the two
rules could not be applied compatibly. Justice Stevens joined on this pertinence point to
create a majority for the conclusion that Rule 23 governed the class certification issue,
and in doing so, left only the issue of Rule 23’s validity to be resolved.149
Turning to that question, Justice Scalia argued that the Enabling Act, as
interpreted in Sibbach, articulated a “single criterion” standard for determining the
validity of a Federal Rule.150 To be valid under the Act, he said, repeating Sibbach’s
well-known phrase, a Rule must “really regulate procedure.”151 If it does this, no further
inquiry is needed; the Rule is valid and must be applied.152 A Rule “really regulates
procedure,” he continued, “if it governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the
litigants’ rights are ‘enforced’”; the Rule does not regulate procedure ”if it alters ‘the
rules of decision by which [a] court will adjudicate [those] rights.’”153 Applying “that
criterion” to Rule 23, he concluded that the Rule qualified as one of “manner and means”
because it allowed “multiple claims (and claims by or against multiple parties) to be
litigated together . . . [and left] the parties’ legal rights . . . unchanged.”154 As a
consequence, it was not necessary to ask whether the New York penalty statute created
substantive rights. “The substantive nature of [the] New York law . . . makes no
difference”;155 only the nature of the Federal Rule mattered.156
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See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 452-58.
See id. at 401 (majority opinion).
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See id. at 406-10.
150
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 411-12. Scalia was joined on this view by only three other Justices.
151
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407.
152
Scalia added that Congress was free to rewrite the Act if it did not like this reading of it, see Shady
Grove, 559 U.S. at 413-14, though he did not say how it could make the intention to enact a two-part
standard clearer.
153
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (citation omitted). This was familiar language: all of the Enabling
Act cases had used it, but the expression “manner and means” is not a great deal clearer than the expression
“really regulates procedure,” so Justice Scalia gave examples of Federal Rules that over the years had been
held to regulate the “manner and means” of enforcing substantive rights. Id. at 407. These examples
included rules authorizing service of process, providing for mental and physical examinations, and
permitting sanctions for signing court papers without a reasonable inquiry. Id. Each of these rules, he said,
“had some practical effect on the parties’ rights, but each undeniably regulated only the process for
enforcing those rights; none altered the rights themselves.” Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407-08.
154
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 408.
155
Id. at 409.
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Justice Scalia might have intended to limit this “single criterion” reading of the
Enabling Act to the familiar situation in which a Federal Rule had only an incidental or
insubstantial effect on substantive rights, and take no position on the more difficult
question of whether a Federal Rule is valid if it abridges substantive rights completely.
He did not say this directly, but he seemed to imply that a rule written in the procedural
language required by the Enabling Act could never abridge substantive rights because
language was not that malleable. On the other hand, he also seemed to suggest that
sometimes sacrificing substantive state law was just an inevitable consequence of
preserving a uniform system of federal procedure. Either way, on his view subsection (b)
of the Enabling Act said the same thing as subsection (a); it just said it again, louder. He
admitted that his reading of the Act “gives short shrift to the statutory text,”157 but argued
that Sibbach had interpreted the Act in that way,158 and “Sibbach has been settled law . . .
for nearly seven decades.”159 Setting aside such a longstanding and well-settled
precedent, he said, would “require a ‘special justification’ beyond a bare belief that it was
wrong,”160 and he found no such justification in Shady Grove.
Justice Stevens made the most sustained objection to this “single criterion”
view,161 grounding his argument principally on the “Surplusage” canon of statutory
construction.162 He argued, in a manner more commonly identified with Justice Scalia,
that all parts of a statute’s text must be given effect, that Congress is presumed to have
intended everything it enacts.163 Sibbach failed to discuss the Enabling Act’s
156

See id. at 416. Justice Scalia supported this reading of the Act with an argument based on a combination
of Sibbach and Hanna. As he put it, “[t]he validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon whether it
regulates procedure. If it does, it is authorized by § 2072 and is valid in all jurisdictions, with respect to all
claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon state-created rights . . . . To the extent Sibbach did not [say
this], Hanna surely did.” Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410-12, 412 n.9 (citation omitted). The use of Hanna as
a backup in the event the argument from Sibbach fails suggests that Scalia may have had doubts about the
argument from Sibbach.
157
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 412.
158
See id. at 411-13.
159
Id. at 413. Interestingly enough, about a decade earlier Justice Scalia had treated the Act as having a
two-part validity standard. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001)
(arguing that “to find a rule governing the effect that must be accorded federal judgments by other courts
ensconced in rules governing the internal procedures of the rendering court itself . . . would arguably
violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules ‘shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right . . . .’”).
160
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 413 (citation omitted).
161
Justice Ginsburg made the strongest objections to Scalia’s views in the Shady Grove opinion as a whole,
but given her position that Rule 23 was not pertinent to the issue in dispute, she did not discuss the question
of whether the Rule was valid, and thus did not discuss Scalia’s Sibbach-based “single criterion”
interpretation of the Enabling Act validity standard.
162
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 50, at 275 (describing the “rule against surplusage”). But see Redish &
Murashko, supra note 22, at 37-38 (describing how the surplusage canon “when critically examined, might
lose its bite for several reasons.”).
163
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The question, therefore, is not what rule we
think would be easiest on federal courts. The question is what rule Congress established. Although, Justice
Scalia may generally prefer easily administrable, bright-line rules, his preference does not give us license to
adopt a second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act. Courts cannot ignore text and context in the
service of simplicity.”).
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independent prohibition on abridging substantive rights, he argued, because the parties
did not raise the issue, not because the Court thought the prohibition was redundant.164
Justice Scalia responded with a statutory construction argument of his own, grounded on
what one might think of as the “Interpretive Gloss” canon.165 The meaning of a statute,
he argued, is found not only in its text but also in the interpretation given that text in case
law over the years. The “single criterion” interpretation of the Enabling Act validity
standard attributed to Sibbach, he continued, had been so widely and consistently
followed as precedent for such a long time that it simply was too late in the game to begin
the interpretation process all over again, too late to read the Enabling Act literally as if
one was reading it for the first time.166 The “really regulates procedure” paraphrase of
the Act’s validity standard was “settled law,” he said, and only Congress could change
it.167
A disagreement of this sort cannot be resolved at the level of interpretive method.
There are no meta canons of statutory construction, for example, to say whether the
Surplusage canon (and the policies embodied in it), or the Interpretive Gloss canon (and
the policies embodied in it), is more authoritative. The Justices seemed to recognize this,
since almost immediately they turned their attention to arguments based on the purposes
and intentions underlying the Enabling Act. Justice Scalia supported his “single
criterion” view, for example, with an argument reminiscent of the Burlington Northern
case, that the Federal Rules should have the same meaning everywhere, all of the time,
and in all types of cases.168 He dismissed the idea that a Rule could be valid in one state
and invalid in another depending upon the presence or absence of a particular state
law.169 Protecting federal procedural uniformity, he argued, was more important than
protecting state legislative prerogatives.170 Good textualist that he was, he did not frame
his argument as a policy preference for uniform rules over legislative prerogatives, but
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 426-27 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens also adopted Professor Ely’s
view that Sibbach passed on the opportunity to define the meaning of substantive rights because that would
have resulted in “shifting control from the Federal Rules to the federal courts.” See Ely, Irrepressible
Myth, supra note 46, at 733-37.
165
The “interpretive gloss” canon describes a collection of individual canons more than a single one,
depending upon the particular institution responsible for adding the interpretive gloss. See ESKRIDGE ET
AL., supra note 50, at 290 (the reenactment rule), at 391 (the acquiescence rule), at 298 (the common law
rule), and at 292-94 (the in pari materia rule).
166
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 413-14 (majority opinion). Scalia seemed to admit that the text of the
Act, if read literally, articulated a two-part standard, see id. at 411-12, and it seems hard to deny this.
167
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 413-14. Scalia and Stevens also disagreed over the proper method for
defining “substantive rights” in section (b) of the Act. Scalia thought it proper to interpret the text using
only language tools, see id., at 403-06, whereas Stevens thought it proper to consider the purposes and
effects of the Act as well as its text. Id. at 432-35. For Stevens, a state law that protected substantive
policies, even if framed in the language of procedure, would count as substantive under the Act. Id. In this,
he agreed with Ginsburg. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 419-20 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Shady
Grove, 559 U.S. at 443-445 (Ginsburg dissenting).
168
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 412-15 (majority opinion).
169
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 409 (“A Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and
invalid in others—or valid in some cases and invalid in others—depending upon whether its effect is to
frustrate a state substantive law.”)
170
See id. at 409-10. Scalia did not say why federal procedural uniformity was the superior interest. He
simply assumed that to be the case.
164
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instead as an argument for following “settled law.”171 He was not interested in policy
arguments as such. The policy debate was over as far as he was concerned. It had been
resolved in Sibbach.172
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg denied that the need for federal procedural
uniformity trumped all other policy considerations, but each for a different reason.
Justice Stevens argued that the Enabling Act was designed to “balance” the interest in
uniform Federal Rules against the interest of respecting state legislative prerogatives, not
elevate one interest over the other.173 “While Congress [had] the constitutional power to
prescribe procedural rules that interfered with state substantive law,” he said, “that is not
what Congress has done” in the Enabling Act.174 The Act’s prohibition on abridging
substantive rights, he continued, “does not mean that federal rules cannot displace state
policy judgments; it means only that federal rules cannot displace a State’s definition of
its own rights or remedies.”175 “Congress has . . . struck a balance,” he argued, between
housekeeping rules for federal courts and state rules that affect the character and result of
litigation,176 and while “this can be a tricky balance to implement,”177 it is what Congress
had in mind in including both a “practice and procedure” requirement and an
“abridgement of substantive rights” prohibition in the Enabling Act.178 He would have
struck the balance in favor of the Federal Rule in Shady Grove because, as he saw it, the
New York statute was not unambiguously substantive,179 but in a different case with a
different state law, the balancing could come out the other way.180
171

See id. at 413.
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (majority opinion). But see Burbank & Wolff, supra note 19, at 41
(“[T]he Shady Grove Court’s wooden interpretation of Rule 23 was hardly ordained by precedent.”).
173
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 418-19 (Stevens, J. concurring).
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Id. at 417-18.
175
Id. at 418.
176
See id. at 419.
177
Id. This is so, said Stevens, because it does not depend completely on the form of the state law. See id.
“Rather, it turns on whether the state law actually is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or
remedies.” Id. “A state procedural rule, though undeniably procedural in the ordinary sense of the term,
may exist to influence substantive outcomes, . . . and may in some instances become so bound up with the
state-created right or remedy that it defines the scope of that substantive right or remedy.” Id. at 419-20
(internal quotations and citation omitted). “And were federal courts to ignore those portions of substantive
state law that operate as procedural devices, it could in many instances limit the ways that sovereign States
may define their rights and remedies.” Id. at 420. Stevens dismissed the concern that such an inquiry
would “enmesh federal courts in difficult determinations about whether application of a given rule would
displace a state determination about substantive rights.” Id. at 426. The question, he said, “is not what rule
we think would be easiest on federal courts. The question is what rule Congress established. . . . Courts
cannot ignore text and context in the service of simplicity.” Id.
178
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 424-25 (Stevens, J. concurring) (describing how “Congress struck [a
balance] between uniform rules of federal procedure and respect for a State’s construction of its own rights
and remedies” by including two limitations on the construction of federal rules).
179
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432 (“The text of CPLR §901(b) expressly and unambiguously applies not
only to claims based on New York law but also to claims based on federal law or the law of any other State.
. . . It is therefore hard to see how §901(b) could be understood as a rule that, though procedural in form,
serves the function of defining New York’s rights or remedies.”)
180
Justice Stevens does not say this explicitly, but it is a logical inference from his discussion of the
balancing of interests policy he finds at the heart of the Enabling Act. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 41820 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice Ginsburg objected to Scalia’s procedural uniformity argument for a
different reason. For her, protecting “the federalism principles undergirding Erie”181 was
more important than preserving the uniformity of the Federal Rules. As she saw it, a
federal court should “avoid[] immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would
trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest.” 182 The
Erie doctrine, not the Rules of Decision Act or Enabling Act, was the ultimate source of
this obligation;183 the two statutes simply “mark our way”184 in applying that doctrine.185
When Rule 23 is interpreted with an “awareness of, and sensitivity to, important state
regulatory policies,”186 she continued, the Rule did not conflict with the New York
penalty statute and thus was not pertinent to the issue of whether Shady Grove’s claim
could be certified as a class action.187 If the Rule was not pertinent to the certification
issue it followed that there was no need to determine whether the Rule was valid, and
thus no need to construe the Enabling Act’s prohibition on abridging substantive law.
Consequently, she did not discuss the point.188
It would have been better had the Justices conducted this debate over uniformfederal-rules-versus-state-legislative-prerogatives explicitly in policy terms rather than
through the proxy of “settled law.”189 The law was not “settled,” for one thing, and
getting sidetracked on the issue of whether it was prevented a thorough examination of
the policies at play in the case. It is not clear, for example, that accommodating state
legislative prerogatives poses any greater threat to the uniform application of the Federal
Rules than does the existence of different local rules from one federal judicial district to
another.190 Justice Scalia’s portentous warning about the “disembowel[ment]”191 of the
181

See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 451 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 439. Justice Stevens also adopted the “narrow construction” principle but did not agree that it
made Rule 23 inapplicable. See Shady Grove, at 422-23 (Stevens concurring) (discussing the need to
engage in a “savings” construction of the Federal Rule to avoid a conflict with state law.)
183
Professor Sherry makes a similar argument. See notes 189-190, infra, and accompanying text.
184
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 438.
185
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing how Federal Rule 23 did not
apply to the issue before the court).
186 Id. at 437
187
Id. at 446 (“The Court, I am convinced, finds conflict where none is necessary.”)
188
She discussed the nature of the rights created by the New York penalty statute, but only to show that the
statute created a rule of decision under Erie, not a substantive right under the Enabling Act. The Rules of
Decision Act and the Enabling Act work with different definitions of “substantive” law. See Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
189
This is Professor Sherry’s view, since she sees the Enabling Act as a subset of the “Erie doctrine,” and
the Erie doctrine as policy more than law. See Suzanna Sherry, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Why the
Court Can’t Fix the Erie Doctrine, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 173, 178 (2013) (“[I]t is the Erie doctrine, not
the [Enabling Act], that controls the decision of whether a particular state rule prevails over a conflicting
federal one. . . [and] Erie . . . is quite explicitly tailored to protecting the substantive law and policies of
individual states and thus allows federal law to operate in some states but not others.”); id. at 193 (“Under
my proposal, the Court would instead have to decide explicitly whether the federal interest in uniform,
transsubstantive procedural rules for federal courts is more important than allowing states to make
substantive policy choices.”).
190
Professor Rosenberg has characterized federal court local rules as a “procedural tower of Babel.” See
Hearings on S. 915 and H. A 6111 before the S. Subcomm. on Improvements to Judicial Machinery, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 282 (1967) (testimony of Professor Maurice Rosenberg). See also Steven Flanders, Local
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federal judicial system might have been hyperbole for effect more than an accurate
prediction of the consequences of adopting a two-part view of the Enabling Act validity
standard.192
Similarly, a system of uniform Federal Rules might pose little or no threat to state
legislative prerogatives. It may not be possible to write Federal Rules in the language of
“practice and procedure” required by the Enabling Act that have more than an incidental
or insubstantial effect on state substantive rights.193 Language simply may not be that
flexible. Whether these and other such concerns are real, however, are empirical
questions that needed to be answered by the Court on the basis of actual evidence rather
than thought experiments, ideological commitments, and axiomatic pronouncements.
The Justices needed at least a rough empirical sense of how often the Federal Rules were
likely to conflict with state substantive law before they could answer the questions194 and
to have this sense, they first needed to define the Enabling Act’s conception of
“substantive rights.”195 Even dismissing subsection (b) of the Act as redundant required
an understanding of what it said.

Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or Information, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213
(1981); Robert Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV.
853, 853 (1989); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and States Rules: Uniformity, Divergence
and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989). Professor Sherry points to another
example of how the Rules are not applied uniformly in all cases. As she explains, the Supreme Court’s
insistence that the Federal Rules are transsubstantive does not comport with the Court’s different
application of them in different types of cases, depending upon the content of state law. Sherry, supra note
189, at 193 n.93. Allstate’s brief in Shady Grove identified other state laws that might create a conflict
with Federal Rules similar to that created by the New York penalty statute. See note 194, infra. On the
importance of uniformity in federal procedural rules generally, see Thomas O. Main, Procedural
Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That
Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311 (2001).
191
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 416 (majority opinion) (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473-74).
192
Bauer, supra note 19, at 965 (“[T]he assertion that federal courts would encounter chaos in an absence
of complete uniformity of procedural rules seems overwrought.”). See also Burbank & Wolff, supra note
19, at 46-47 (“[W]e believe that the application of a Federal Rule may vary not according to the putative
policies underlying state law on the same matter, but rather according to the structure and operation of state
law as it interacts with and is implemented by the litigation process. Because schemes of substantive rights
are not uniform, the respect for such schemes that the Enabling Act enjoins may require just such
differential application.”).
193
See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 19, at 48 (“Many, if not most, of the Federal Rules are charters for
discretionary decision making, setting boundaries and leaving the actual choices to federal trial judges. To
that extent, they are only superficially uniform and superficially transsubstantive. The uniformity at which
the Enabling Act aims must be measured in pragmatic terms, neither fatally undermined by an approach
that focuses on policies underlying state law on the same issue, nor cemented by jingoistic dogma heedless
of the evolving realities of court rulemaking and litigation practice . . . .”).
194
Justice Scalia suggested that there would be “hundreds” of such instances, but then changed that
estimate to “countless state rules” later in the same sentence. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 415. See also
id. at 1468 n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing “numerous state statutory provisions” that could
conflict with Federal Rules); Brief for Respondent at App’x A, Shady Grove, 559 U.S. 393 (No. 08-1008),
2009 WL 2777648 (Allstate brief listing 96 examples of state laws that could conflict with Federal Rules).
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See generally Ely, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 46, at 733-37 (describing different ways to define
“substantive rights” in the Enabling Act); Burbank, supra note 33, at 1122-25 (describing Congress’s
conception of substantive rights in enacting the statute).
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Shady Grove was the first Supreme Court decision to raise the “one-or-two-part
validity standard” issue explicitly and discuss it those terms. It did this presumably to
resolve the issue, but when the dust had settled, the meaning of the Enabling Act was
more uncertain than ever. In a little over seven decades, the Court had reduced a majority
view (“really regulates procedure”) to a plurality one, introduced a middle ground
position (“balance” federal and state interests),196 and failed to subject the policy
considerations that underlay the competing interpretations of the Act to careful empirical
testing. This is not exactly a loaves-and-fishes level of performance.

IV. DISABLING THE ENABLING ACT
In the period leading up to the passage of the Enabling Act, federal courts sitting
in diversity applied federal substantive law and state procedural rules under the combined
commands of Swift v. Tyson and the Conformity Act of 1872.197 This order of things was
reversed after the decision in Erie, the passage of the Enabling Act, and the promulgation
of the Federal Rules, so that diversity courts now applied state substantive law and
federal procedural rules, and this about-face forced the courts to consider both the
federalism and separation of powers dimensions of the Enabling Act.198 Separation of
powers sentiments drove the passage of the Act and shaped Justice Frankfurter’s dissent
in Sibbach (not surprising since Sibbach presented a genuine separation of powers
problem), but the Sibbach majority did not discuss the Act’s federalism dimension for an
understandable reason: the parties did not ask it to.199 The Hanna and Burlington
Northern cases raised federalism issues—each involved a direct collision between state
and federal law—but the Court avoided the issue in each instance by finding that the
differences between the state and federal rules were not substantial enough to amount to
an abridgement of the rights created by the state law, whatever their nature. It was not
until the Justices interpreted the Enabling Act from the incommensurable federalism and
separation of powers perspectives of Justices Ginsburg and Scalia200 in Shady Grove that
the Court had to harmonize the two dimensions of the Act, but unfortunately, it was not
ready to do so.
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Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 418-21 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing the balance of federal and state
interests interpretation of the Enabling Act).
197
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842); Conformity Act, ch. 255, § 8 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872).
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See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 19, at 37 (describing how Sibbach had become out of step with legal
developments). The early twentieth century also saw a major extension of federal substantive law making
power into areas previously regulated by the states. In this context, a federal statute prohibiting federal
procedural rules from “abridging, enlarging or modifying substantive rights” inevitably would have been
heard as reassurance to the states, not just Congress, that federal courts would not invalidate legislative
enactments under the guise of making procedural rules. See Redish & Murashko, supra note 22, at 66-76
(describing the “broad statutory purposes and policies undoubtedly underlying the legislation enacted in
1934.”)
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See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 427 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring). As the majority saw it, the case also
did not raise a conflict between state and federal law. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14 (application of the
Federal Rule does not result in an invasion of the state right to be free from personal restraint).
200
Scalia attributed the separation of powers rendering of the Act to Sibbach. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S.
at 411-14 (majority opinion).
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The principles of separation of powers and federalism have long histories in
American jurisprudence.201 Each defines a fundamental feature of the American
constitutional system and each evokes strong emotional and intellectual loyalties.
Ordinarily, the two principles work in tandem, each governing a different aspect of the
division of labor between courts and legislatures and the division of sovereignty between
state and federal governments, and usually it is possible to give full effect to one without
compromising the other. But sometimes the principles can collide, as they seemed to in
Shady Grove, and when this happens, Justices reasoning sincerely and impeccably from
incompatible starting points can speak past one another as if they were the only ones in
the room. This reconfiguration of the Enabling Act debate into a conflict between not
only different understandings of statutory language, but also between different
constitutional principles, hardened the competing viewpoints in dispute and made
agreement on a single, consensus interpretation of the Act less likely.202
Present day jurisprudential fashion has added an additional layer of complication
to the problem. Since Sibbach, analysis of the Enabling Act has been based on
competing assumptions about the proper way to do statutory interpretation, though rarely
has this factor been discussed explicitly or been made an independent basis of the
decisions in individual cases.203 That also changed in Shady Grove, where the Justices’
commitments to conflicting theories of interpretation were an express reason the Court
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Those histories are not static. For example, the conventional understanding of Federalism, which saw
the several states as autonomous laboratories designed to “promote[] choice, foster[] competition,
facilitate[] participation, enable[] experimentation, and ward[] off a national Leviathan” in political and
legislative matters is now challenged by a new “nationalist” Federalism, in which the states are seen as the
national government’s agents for “improving national politics, knitting together the national polity,
improving national policymaking, and entrenching national power and national policies.” See Heather K.
Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1890, 1891, 1894 (2014).
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The Enabling Act’s text is a major source of this problem. The “practice and procedure” requirement in
section (a) instructs the Supreme Court to stay within the limits of its constitutional authority when making
Federal Rules (separation of powers), while the prohibition on abridging substantive rights in section (b)
instructs it to respect the prerogatives of legislative actors (federalism). See Redish & Murashko, supra
note 22, at 27-28 (“The principal reason why construction of the Rules Enabling Act has eluded anything
approaching consensus lies in the two key sections of the Act. . . . The question is, how should the two
sections be construed when taken together?”). Congress may not have intended to include both types of
instructions in the Act, but it included them nonetheless, and courts ordinarily have an obligation to give
effect to all of a law’s text, not just the parts that were intended, or the parts the courts prefer. See Shady
Grove, 559 U.S. at 403. As Justice Scalia might have put it, a court’s job is to enforce law, not intentions,
and law is what a legislature enacted, not what it intended to enact. He repeated this familiar mantra in
Shady Grove in discussing the New York penalty statute. See id. (“[A] [l]egislature’s purpose . . . cannot
override the statute’s clear text . . . . The manner in which the law ‘could have been written, . . . has no
bearing; what matters is the law the legislature did enact. We cannot rewrite that to reflect our perception
of legislative purpose.”) Oddly, however, he did not take his own advice in parsing the Enabling Act. See
Shady Grove, 449 U.S. at 412 (majority opinion) (Scalia acknowledging “there is something to” the point
that he is ignored statutory text).
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Professors Redish and Murashko provide a comprehensive and fair description of the presently popular
theories of statutory interpretation. See Redish & Murashko, supra note 22, at 42-55. See also Roosevelt,
supra note 19, at 53 (“Shady Grove is important because the way the Court interprets ambiguous state
statutes will affect outcomes . . . .”); Redish & Murashko, supra, at 57-66 (describing “The Relevance of
Statutory Interpretation Theory in Interpreting the Rules Enabling Act”).
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was unable to agree on anything but outcome.204 Justice Scalia derived the meaning of
the Act exclusively from (some of) its language and the interpretations given that
language over the years. He ignored arguments based on statutory purpose, legislative
intention, interpretive presumptions, and practical effects, and defended his “single
criterion” interpretation of the Act as “unmistakably” correct, while dismissing the
competing interpretations of Justices Ginsburg and Stevens as clearly rejected by the case
law, or as “not so.”205 When he relied on non-textualist considerations to support his
argument, as he did in invoking the policy of federal procedural uniformity, he couched
those considerations in textualist rather than policy terms, as an argument for “settled
law” rather than the superiority of one policy interest over another.206 In a sense, he
justified his interpretation of the Act much like a “Tiger”207 parent telling a child why she
had to take squash lessons: “Because I said so.”
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, read the Act in light of its purposes, the realworld effects produced by one interpretation or the other, and presumptions about the
proper role of separation of powers and federalism concerns.208 He started from the
federalism premise that “a federal rule [is not valid under the Act if it] would displace a
state law that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a
state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right.”209
Reading the Act to authorize such a Rule, he said, would not show sufficient “sensitivity
to important state interests . . . and regulatory policies.”210 In addition, he did not agree
with Justice Scalia’s assertion that the sole question to be asked under the Act is “whether
[a Federal Rule] ‘regulates the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ rights are
enforced.”211 This reading of the Act, he argued, out-textualizing Justice Scalia, “ignores
the second limitation” in the Act’s text—that the Federal Rules “not abridge, enlarge, or
204

Id.
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410 (“Hanna unmistakably expressed the same understanding . . .”); id. at
411 n.9 (“There could not be a clearer rejection of the theory the concurrence now advocates.”); id. at 399
(“Allstate suggests that eligibility must depend on the particular cause of action asserted, . . . But that is not
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See id. at 412-13.
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AMY CHUA, THE BATTLE HYMN OF THE TIGER MOTHER 4 (2011) (explaining how a “working class”
white father can be a “Chinese Tiger mother”). See also Amy Chua, Why Chinese Mothers Are Superior,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2011),
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This approach, say Redish and Murashko, asks how “a reasonable observer who is familiar with the
socio-political or economic problem that the statute was designed to deal with or respond to would
understand how the disputed statutory provision would apply to the specific factual situation before the
court.” See Redish & Murashko, supra note 22, at 52. They describe the approach as “an island of
common sense amidst various interpretive approaches that ask a judge to do either too much (determining
actual intentions of those enacting a particular statute) or too little (interpreting words in a vacuum).” Id. at
55.
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See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring). He gave statutes of limitations, burden of
proof rules, and rules for reviewing damages on appeal, as examples of federal procedural rules that could
displace a State’s formulation of its substantive law. Id. at 425 n.9.
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Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 424 (citations omitted).
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Id. (citation omitted).
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modify any substantive right—and in so doing ignores the balance that Congress struck
between uniform rules of federal procedure and respect for a State’s construction of its
own rights and remedies.”212 Both separation-of-powers and federalism presumptions, he
said, “counsel against judicially created rules displacing state substantive law.”213
Each Justice’s approach to statutory interpretation respects the intentions of
legislative actors, but each works with a different conception of legislative intent and a
different understanding of how it is learned. For Justice Scalia, and textualists generally,
legislative intent is intent at the time of enactment, found exclusively in the ordinary
meaning of language, and once expressed, is static and timeless. For Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg,214 and purposivists generally, legislative intent is intent at the time of
interpretation, found in the evidence of legislator states of mind and the purposes
reasonably attributable to enactments, and is open-ended and malleable, capable of being
adapted to changing circumstances and conditions.215 Textualists are concerned that
judges left free to speculate about legislator intent will substitute their personal
preferences for those of democratically elected representatives, while purposivists are
concerned that judges not free to speculate about such states of mind will fail to make the
adjustments to new or changed social conditions that legislators would make were they in
a position to do so.216 Each view has a downside, of course, obtuseness in the case of
textualism, and arrogance in the case of purposivism, and unfortunately there is no
objectively correct way to choose between the two.217 Debates over theories of
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Justice Ginsburg probably would have interpreted the Enabling Act in much the same manner as Stevens
had it been necessary for her to do so, but given her conclusion that Rule 23 was not pertinent to the class
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Judge Richard Posner is the most articulate proponent of this “faithful agent” view. See Richard A.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817
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imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.”) See also Roosevelt, supra
note 19, at 53 (“Scalia’s rather wooden textualism does not make much sense when trying to determine
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interpretation (in all fields, not just law), are as longstanding and intractable as any
debates in the realm of ideas generally.218 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Justices
talked past one another at the epistemological and theoretical levels in Shady Grove, as
well as the literal one.
Scholarly commentary on the Enabling Act provides little help in resolving these
difficulties. Academic commentators have proposed a wide array of solutions to the
Enabling Act interpretation problem over the years, and continue to do so, but none of
these proposals has commanded the assent of other academic commentators or a majority
of the Court. To use only recent examples, Professor Burbank argues that the Court
should interpret the Act in terms of its original separation-of-powers purposes and
neutralize the adverse federalism effects of such an approach by using federal common
law and a dynamic approach to statutory interpretation to prevent intrusions by Federal
Rules into the domain of state substantive lawmaking.219 Professors Redish and
Murashko dismiss this approach as a “house of cards,”220 and argue instead for a refined
version of the “incidental effects” test used in Hanna and Burlington Northern to enforce
the “two broad purposes motivating the Act’s framers.”221 This, they contend, would
“avoid[] all the problems caused by the narrow and counterproductive attempt to discern
the actual intent of the enacting Congress by instead seeking only to facilitate objectively
determined background purposes motivating the Act.”222 Professor Sherry rejects both of
convincing others to see things their way. They argue that “the Rules Enabling Act serves as a
quintessential illustration of a statute whose ambiguous text must be interpreted in light of objectively
determined background purposes, rather than via a narrow focus on either the literal meaning of the text or
the specifics of legislative history.” Id. at 32. They describe an “incidental effects interpretive model” that
“does a far better job than the others of recognizing and implementing the purposive DNA of the Rules
Enabling Act.” Id. at 57-58. In this respect, their take on the Enabling Act debate is similar to a common
theme in Irish nationalist music—“it’s not over.”
218
See SCALIA, supra note 44, at 23 (“American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and
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THE LEGAL PROCESS 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)). Theories of
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legislator intent (purposivism), practical effects (consequentialism), or all of the above (dynamism), though
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emphases. Theories of interpretation cycle in and out of influence on a regular basis. Every theory has had
its day in the spotlight, usually when a well-known proponent, either academic or judicial, has achieved a
high level of prominence, only to fade to black as its deficiencies become clearer with use, or its
proponents lose influence.
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See Burbank, supra note 33, at 1114. Professors Redish and Murashko take issue with this approach.
See Redish & Murashko, supra note 22, at 83 (“Burbank’s . . . standard . . . . has the effect of seriously
restricting the rulemakers’ powers to enforce the rules’ procedural directives. When Burbank has his
standard recognize safety valves, it does so on the basis of completely imagined or rationally dubious
factors.”).
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See Redish & Murashko, supra note 22, at 83 (“If one carefully examines the historical basis and
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See Redish & Murashko, supra note 22, at 87. Professors Redish and Murashko trace the “incidental
effects” test to the Burlington Northern decision, but the Court articulated this test first in Hanna twenty
years earlier. See id. at 86 n.308 (“Although both Murphree and Hanna mention the phrase ‘incidental
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these approaches as a “pox on both your houses,” and argues instead for an approach that
interprets the Enabling Act in light of the “Erie doctrine” to require a balancing of federal
and state interests to determine the validity of a Federal Rule.223 Like Justice Ginsburg,
she sees the Act as an expression of policy more than law, and would make judges rather
than legislators its principal authors. The variety and incompatibility of these different
approaches to interpretation224—intentionalist, purposivist, and dynamic—make it clear
that, if anything, academics are more divided than members of the Court on how to
proceed.
In light of these difficulties, it seems unrealistic to expect the controversy over the
Enabling Act’s validity standard to be resolved anytime soon. It has been more than
seventy years since Sibbach was decided and a consensus interpretation has yet to be
reached.225 An impasse of this magnitude and duration is not likely to be broken by a
new analytical insight, innovative argument, or surprise research discovery,226 making
one point of view demonstrably correct and the others demonstrably false. Able and
highly regarded Justices and scholars have tried all of those strategies and the impasse
remains. Political alliances on the Court could change, of course, and a majority for one
See Sherry, supra note 189, at 190-91. There is a perhaps unintended irony in Professor Sherry’s “Erie
Doctrine” argument. The controlling law in Erie was the Rules of Decision Act, not a court-created legal
doctrine. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80 (1938) (describing how the Court reinterpreted the Rules of Decision
Act to require the application of state substantive law). To think otherwise is to see the decision as
grounded on a “brooding omnipresence of reason in the sky,” the very conception of law Erie repudiated in
overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). Professor Ely pointed out many years ago that Erie is the name
of a case, not a doctrine, but many continue to miss the force of this point. See Condlin, Formstone, supra
note 3, at 509-11 (describing the reluctance of some academic commentators to accept the idea that the
decision in Erie was based on the Rules of Decision Act). If Erie was a doctrine, and the Enabling Act
incorporated it, one still would not balance federal and state interests to determine the validity of a Federal
Rule. Byrd is the only support for a balancing test in the Erie line of cases, but the Supreme Court
repudiated Byrd balancing in Hanna. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9. See also id. at 516-17 (describing
the Hanna decision’s rejection of the Byrd balancing test).
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There are many more. See note 19, supra.
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See Redish & Murashko, supra note 22, at 27 (“To this day, no real consensus has developed as to how
the Act should be interpreted.”) The Court’s impasse on this issue may reflect a larger difficulty it has with
procedural rules generally. It is not clear, for example, why the Court took certiorari in Shady Grove if it
was not ready to decide whether section (b) of the Act had independent content. That was the only difficult
issue in the case. No one doubted that Rule 23 was a rule of practice and procedure. Yet, having taken the
case, the Court could not resolve the issue. Something similar happened in the McIntyre case in the 2011
term, see J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), where the Court granted
certiorari seemingly to resolve a longstanding controversy over the nature of the purposefulness
requirement in the “stream of commerce” subset of personal jurisdiction doctrine, only to find when it came
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grants of certiorari in the same area of law, so close in time.
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Charles Warren, described in Erie, of a previously unknown draft of the Rules of Decision Act allegedly
indicating that the Act intended to include state decisional law as well as state statutes in the phrase “rules
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(prohibiting polygamy). See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 86 (1923) (describing a previously unknown draft of the Rules of Decision
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(describing Woodruff’s discovery).
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or another view could emerge,227 but if that was going to happen it also probably would
have happened before now. Seventy years is long enough for every point of view to rise
to the surface and every political coalition to form. The disagreements in Enabling Act
jurisprudence are philosophical and political more than linguistic and interpretive, and
there is no overarching philosophical or political framework into which the competing
perspectives can be converted, or set of reconciliatory principles through which the
perspectives can be combined and synthesized.
The short of it then is that argument over the Enabling Act, at least in the Act’s
present form, is likely to continue indefinitely into the future, oscillating between
incompatible sovereignty principles and competing theories of interpretation, in a debate
no one can win (or lose). Like debates over the meaning of due process, commerce,
religion, and other fundamental constitutional principles, debate over the Enabling Act’s
substance/procedure distinction is shaped by mutually exclusive intellectual
commitments that make common ground more rather than less difficult to find. In the
absence of a framework for reconciling or selecting among the competing views,
therefore, muddling through is about all that is left.228 But muddling through suspends
Enabling Act interpretation in mid-air, effectively disabling the Act in litigation involving
disagreements over the application of the Federal Rules, forcing litigants to guess
whether the decision to apply a Federal Rule in a given case will depend upon predictable
ritual, judicial power grab, or law-based judgment. Will the Rule automatically be found
valid, as Justice Harlan famously predicted in his “arguably procedural, ergo
constitutional” sarcasm (as Justice Scalia preferred),229 will it be construed narrowly in
light of tacit federalism principles, to be taken out of play on pertinence grounds
whenever it threatens state legislative prerogatives (as Justice Ginsburg prefers),230 or
will it be tested against an actual substance/procedure standard everyone can agree on (as
Justice Stevens preferred)? The first two of these possibilities promote cynicism about the
rule of law, and the third looks as if it never will be tried.231

V. CONCLUSION
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It is perhaps a little surprising that after all these years the Supreme Court has not
been able to agree on the standard for determining the validity of a Federal Rule. Even a
blind squirrel is reputed to discover an acorn now and then.232 The central logjam in this
interpretive odyssey—deciding whether the Enabling Act standard has one or two parts—
seems simple enough to break, but the Court’s efforts in that regard have been
relentlessly unsuccessful. Sibbach reduced the standard to a single “practice and
procedure” requirement and ignored the Act’s prohibition on abridging substantive rights.
Hanna recognized the prohibition on abridging substantive rights as an independent part
of the standard, but discussed only the concept of “abridgement” and ignored that of
“substantive rights.” Burlington Northern also recognized the substantive rights
prohibition as an independent part of the standard, but rewrote it, to include a
“substantiality” requirement and, like Hanna, failed to say anything about the concept of
substantive rights itself. The Court has not found it difficult to apply the standard over
the years. The next time it finds a Federal Rule invalid will be the first time. But it has
decided Enabling Act cases in such analytically different ways that agreement on
outcome is about the only thing the cases have in common. Not until Shady Grove did
the Court confront the question of whether the Act articulates a “one- or two-part validity
standard,” but then having done so, it could not muster a majority for one or the other
answer. Perhaps it is time for Congress to act, this time to “really regulate procedure.”
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See THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN PROVERBS 238-39 (Charles Clay Doyle et al. eds., 2012) (surmising
that the squirrel and acorn version of this familiar proverb is a twist on an earlier version involving a pig
and acorn). See also MARTIN H. MANSER, THE FACTS ON FILE DICTIONARY OF PROVERBS 74 (2007) (“even
a blind pig occasionally picks up an acorn”); A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN PROVERBS (Wolfgang Mieder
et al. eds., 1992) (“even a blind pig occasionally picks up an acorn.” Rec. dist.: Colo. Ill., Ky.); JON R.
STONE, THE ROUTLEDGE BOOK OF WORLD PROVERBS (2007) (“even a blind pig finds an acorn now and
then”—Russian); RICHARD M. DORSON, BUYING THE WIND: REGIONAL FOLKLORE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1972) (“Even a blind pig will sometimes find an acorn.”) (from EDWIN MILLER FOGEL, PROVERBS OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA GERMANS (1929)) (listing the saying in Pa. German and High German). There also is a pig
and truffle version of the proverb but it makes less sense. Pigs (more accurately, “truffle hogs”), find
truffles by smelling and rooting them out with their noses, and being blind would not prevent them from
doing this. See Walter Sullivan, “Truffles: Why Pigs Can Sniff Them Out,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 1982),
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/24/garden/truffles-why-pigs-can-sniff-them-out.html.
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